Carlos Johnson v. DHO Chambers by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-26-2012 
Carlos Johnson v. DHO Chambers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Carlos Johnson v. DHO Chambers" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 827. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/827 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 CLD-202       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1467 
___________ 
 
CARLOS JOHNSON, 
                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DHO CHAMBERS; WARDEN BRYAN BLEDSOE; 
INVOLVED LEWISBURG WARDENS 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00831) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 14, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: June 26, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Carlos Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the District Court 
granting the defendant-appellees’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment.  Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
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affirm.  See
I 
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 2011, Johnson filed in the District Court a Bivens
 In October 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment.  After some confusion because of Johnson’s transfer to a halfway 
house and subsequent release from custody, the motion was properly served on Johnson, 
but he did not file a response.  The District Court issued an order under Local Rule 7.6 
directing him to respond or have the motion deemed unopposed, but Johnson again failed 
 action against several 
employees of the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where he had 
been an inmate in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”).  Johnson later filed an 
amended complaint raising several claims, only a few of which were deemed non-
frivolous.  First, Johnson alleged that Disciplinary Hearing Officer Chambers, Warden 
Bledsoe, and other “involved wardens” failed to properly investigate the incident that led 
to Johnson’s disciplinary hearing.  Johnson claimed that, both before his disciplinary 
hearing and afterwards, these officials acted to unfairly double-cell Johnson in a small 
cell and restricted his visitation, phone, and commissary privileges.  Finally, Johnson 
argued that, in an unrelated incident, he was exposed to a canister of pepper spray, which 
had been used against an inmate in a neighboring cell, and that Correctional Officer 
Klosner did not remove the canister afterwards or properly decontaminate the area based 
on orders to teach the other SMU inmates a lesson.   
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to file a response. 
 The Magistrate Judge issued a lengthy report and recommendation (“R&R”) 
concluding that dismissal was appropriate under Local Rule 7.6 and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41.  Johnson submitted a letter responding to the report and recommendation, 
which the District Court construed as his formal objections.  The District Court then 
granted the motion to dismiss / summary judgment motion, adopting the R&R in its 
entirety.  Johnson timely appealed that order. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm if 
Johnson does not raise a substantial question on appeal, see 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6, and we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 
242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  We need not reach the question whether dismissal 
was warranted under Rule 41 because we agree with the District Court that Johnson’s 
claims were without merit; it was therefore appropriate to grant the defendants’ summary 
judgment motion.1
 In evaluating whether summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate, we 
exercise plenary review, “and we must apply the same standard the district court was 
 
                                                 
1Johnson has not expressly challenged the District Court’s dismissal of several of his 
claims as legally frivolous.  See D. Ct. Doc. No. 10.  To the extent that Johnson 
intends to challenge that determination in this appeal, we agree with the District 
Court, for the reasons given in its July 5, 2011 order, that dismissal of those claims 
was approprite. 
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required to apply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56[].”  Spence v. ESAB Group, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Thus, we can affirm only ‘if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).  “A genuine issue of 
material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury 
to return a verdict for that party.”  Id.  “In evaluating the evidence, we must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that 
party’s favor.”  Id.
 Johnson first argued that Warden Bledsoe, DHO Chambers, and unspecified 
“involved wardens” failed to properly investigate the incident that resulted in his 
receiving certain sanctions before and after his disciplinary hearing.  Inasmuch as 
Johnson complained that these officials’ failure to investigate resulted in unfair sanctions 
after his disciplinary hearing, we construe his claim as alleging a due process violation 
with regard to the disciplinary hearing process itself.  Such a claim is barred, however, 
because Johnson’s claim implies that the adverse disciplinary decision is invalid, and he 
has not shown that the adverse decision has been overturned.  
 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
See Edwards v. Balisok
 Further, Johnson’s claims that he was improperly treated as a result of the 
officials’ failure to investigate before his disciplinary hearing lack merit.  Johnson 
, 
520 U.S. 641, 643-46 (1997). 
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complained that, for an unspecified length of time, he was double-celled in a six-by-nine-
foot cell for 23 hours per day on “lockdown” status.  He also complained that his 
visitation, telephone, and commissary privileges were unfairly restricted.  Johnson’s 
complaint is written in a somewhat confusing manner, and it is unclear whether 
Johnson’s claims relate to his initial placement in the SMU, some treatment he may have 
received following the incident that led to his disciplinary hearing, or both.  Regardless of  
which action he takes issue with, Johnson’s treatment in the SMU, and the attendant 
restrictions on his privileges, did not run afoul of either the Due Process Clause or the 
Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.  That is, his 
placement in the SMU did not constitute a dramatic departure from the accepted 
standards for conditions of confinement such that due process was implicated.  See 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 
708 (3d Cir. 1997) (confinement in administrative custody for fifteen months not atypical 
or significant hardship); Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990) (double-
celling, without other evidence of inadequate prison facilities, is constitutionally 
permissible).  Nor did Johnson demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation, as he did 
not show (1) that his placement in the SMU, or the emotional trauma that his placement 
there allegedly caused, resulted in the denial of any basic human need, (2) that he was 
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994), or (3) that prison officials demonstrated a “deliberate 
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indifference” to his health or safety.  Id.
 Finally, Johnson claimed that C.O. Klosner violated his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment by intentionally neglecting to clean up expended pepper spray from the area 
near Johnson’s cell after the spray was used to subdue another inmate, thereby prolonging 
Johnson’s exposure to the spray.  The District Court construed this as an excessive force 
claim, although it could also be construed as a deliberate indifference claim.  In either 
case, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was warranted.  The 
defendant-appellees produced evidence specifically denying Johnson’s allegations and 
suggesting that corrections officers routinely followed recommended procedures for 
decontaminating cell block areas after the use of chemical agents.  Given that Johnson 
did not present any evidence beyond his own bare allegations that he was improperly 
exposed to pepper spray, he failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to that 
issue. 
   
 Accordingly, Johnson has not raised a substantial question on appeal, and we will 
affirm the decision of the District Court. 
